ianstone
06-13-2010, 05:14 PM
Afghan Update
Kandahar Offensive Postponed Until Fall: McChrystal (http://defensetech.org/2010/06/10/kandahar-offensive-postponed-until-fall-mcchrystal/)
http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/06/Stryker-in-Afghanistan.jpg (http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/06/Stryker-in-Afghanistan.jpg)
The offensive planned for this summer to clear and hold Kandahar city will now be delayed until the fall, Afghan commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal tells the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1b651476-74b8-11df-aed7-00144feabdc0.html). The delay will give commanders time to evaluate what went wrong in Marja where a major offensive earlier this year failed to secure the area from Taliban insurgents.
Speaking to reporters at NATO headquarters in Brussels today, McChrystal said (http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4640) operations in Kandahar would be “more deliberate” than initially planned: “I think it will take a number of months for this to play out. But I don’t think that’s necessarily a bad thing. I think it’s more important we get it right than we get it fast.”
McChrystal said there must be visible progress in southern Afghanistan by the end of the year, certainly before NATO’s annual summit in November. After nine years of war, he acknowledged that patience among Afghans, as well as NATO allies, is wearing very thin.
Assessing operations in the Helmand River Valley, he said the major lesson was that the Afghan governance piece, the “build” component of the “clear, hold and build” strategy, must be more robust.
I thought this comment from McChrystal on the difficulty of counterinsurgency was particularly telling:
“Unlike conventional military operations where you circle a hill on the map and then you take the hill, when you go to protect people, the people have to want you to protect them.”
– Greg Grant
Posted in Afghan Update (http://defensetech.org/category/afghan-update/), Counterinsurgency (http://defensetech.org/category/commandos/counterinsurgency/) | Comments (41) (http://defensetech.org/2010/06/10/kandahar-offensive-postponed-until-fall-mcchrystal/#idc-container)
The “Lone Guerrilla Paradox” and the Failure of COIN Doctrine in Afghanistan (http://defensetech.org/2010/06/09/the-lone-guerrilla-paradox-and-the-failure-of-coin-doctrine-in-afghanistan/)
Wednesday, June 9th, 2010 http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/06/Afghan-troops-3.jpg (http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/06/Afghan-troops-3.jpg)
The New York Times runs a story today (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/09/world/asia/09kandahar.html?ref=world) from reporter Rod Nordland in Kandahar about the shift in strategy there away from a military headlined offensive to more aid and reconstruction efforts, with a gradual increase in coalition constables walking the streets.
Partly this is due to local opposition to a military offensive by an “unsympathetic population.” The other major reason, according to the NYT, is the realization among the ISAF command that the much ballyhooed “Operation Moshtarak Phase II,” the Marine Corps air and ground assault on Marja in February, failed.
In a briefing to Pentagon reporters last month, Afghan commander Gen. Stanly McChrystal gave his assessment of the Marja offensive:
“As a counterinsurgency force pushes out insurgents, their smart move is to contest that, to try to undermine what we’ve done. They can’t come in and control Marja like they did before. They can’t raise the flag; they can’t hold terrain. But they can try to convince the people that they’re not secure: Murders, night letters, taxation. And they can try to send a message that says, “This won’t last. The coalition will leave. The government of Afghanistan will leave.”
Then McChrystal described the current security environment in Kandahar:
“[The Taliban] certainly do not control Kandahar city. They can contest parts of Kandahar city and they can create acts so there’s not sufficient security in Kandahar city, but the Taliban do not control the city. You know, you can walk around the streets in Kandahar and there’s business going on. It’s a functioning city.”
These are surprising statements coming from somebody as well versed in counterinsurgency as McChrystal. Insurgents don’t typically “raise the flag,” except perhaps in the final stages of an insurgency when they’ve won the political contest. As far as Kandahar is concerned, the fact that Kandahar city is “functioning” doesn’t mean the insurgents don’t control Kandahar.
One of the many fatal flaws in U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine is the failure to understand the “lone guerrilla paradox,” a concept that has vexed counterinsurgents from Algeria to Vietnam to now Afghanistan.
(more…) (http://defensetech.org/2010/06/09/the-lone-guerrilla-paradox-and-the-failure-of-coin-doctrine-in-afghanistan/#more-7580)
Posted in Afghan Update (http://defensetech.org/category/afghan-update/), Counterinsurgency (http://defensetech.org/category/commandos/counterinsurgency/) | Comments (29) (http://defensetech.org/2010/06/09/the-lone-guerrilla-paradox-and-the-failure-of-coin-doctrine-in-afghanistan/#idc-container)
Strict ROE, Nausea Inducing Screens Curb Use of MV-22 Osprey Gatling Gun (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/28/strict-roe-nausea-inducing-screens-curb-use-of-mv-22-osprey-gatling-gun/)
Friday, May 28th, 2010 http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/05/Osprey-DT-copy.jpg (http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/05/Osprey-DT-copy.jpg)
Our own Christian Lowe is embedded with U.S. forces in Afghanistan through June 1 and sends us this dispatch from Camp Bastion in southern Afghanistan.
By Christian Lowe
CAMP BASTION, Afghanistan — It was touted as the answer to critics who said the MV-22 didn’t have enough firepower on board to shoot its way into a hot LZ.
And here in Afghanistan, this deployment of the MV-22s with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 261 marked the first real-world test of the BAE Systems-made Remote Guardian machine gun system – known in the Corps as the Interim Defensive Weapon System, or “belly gun” for short.
The squadron based here at Bastion air field, adjacent to Camp Leatherneck in Helmand province, has 12 aircraft and an inventory of five of the belly gun systems.
Problem is, they don’t want to use them.
Squadron commander Lt. Col. Ivan Thomas downplayed the difficulties with the system, saying simply that the manufacturer was sending over trainers who could help Marines learn how to use the system more effectively. The IDWS consists of a 7.62mm rotary cannon mounted in a retractable box near amidships on the Osprey’s undercarriage. There’s a targeting and control system inside the bird that uses an X-Box-like controller to steer the optics and gun for 360-degree coverage of the LZ.
Each Osprey also has a M240 7.62mm machine gun mounted to the ramp in the tail. Previous reports have indicated that the Afghanistan Ospreys would have .50 cals mounted on the tail ramp, but the squadron only does that when they think they’re going in guns blazing, which isn’t often.
Thomas said they’ve test fired the Remote Guardian system once, “and it’s extremely accurate,” he said. But with the kind of dynamic approaches these MV-22s are flying into the zone and the difficulty of looking through a soda straw at the LZ and firing at what’s firing at you in time, Thomas has opted to keep the IDWS off every one of his planes.
He argues that the rules of engagement here are so restrictive and the potential downside of a civilian casualty from a misaimed shot so high, he can’t take the risk of firing the Gatling gun if there’s a chance it will miss.
(more…) (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/28/strict-roe-nausea-inducing-screens-curb-use-of-mv-22-osprey-gatling-gun/#more-7395)
Posted in Afghan Update (http://defensetech.org/category/afghan-update/), Grand Ole Osprey (http://defensetech.org/category/grand-ole-osprey/) | Comments (80) (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/28/strict-roe-nausea-inducing-screens-curb-use-of-mv-22-osprey-gatling-gun/#idc-container)
Gen. McChrystal and Adm. Olson Actually on the Same Page (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/27/gen-mcchrystal-and-adm-olson-actually-on-the-same-page/)
Thursday, May 27th, 2010 http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/05/Training-Afghans.jpg (http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/05/Training-Afghans.jpg)
Afghan commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s counterinsurgency guidance (http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/counterinsurgency_guidance.pdf) has taken what many considered to be a very, very soft approach to combating insurgents as laid down in the COIN manual, and softened it even more.
Protecting the population, respecting their culture and sitting and drinking lots of tea with local leaders to gain their trust basically by doing no wrong is the basis of what has been labeled the “population centric counterinsurgency” approach in Afghanistan. The Economist (http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2009/08/is_general_mcchrystal_a_hippie) called it “the least violence-oriented military document you’re ever likely to see.”
“We will not win by simply killing insurgents,” McChrystal wrote; the supply of willing insurgent foot soldiers in that part of the world is infinity. He then explained his version of COIN arithmetic which turns the conventional mindset of wearing down the enemy through attrition on its head.
“From a conventional standpoint, the killing of two insurgents in a group of ten leaves eight remaining: 10–2=8. From the insurgent standpoint, those two killed were likely related to many others who will want vengeance… Therefore, the death of two creates more willing recruits: 10 minus 2 equals 20 (or more) rather than 8.”
According to some reports (http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4643956&c=LAN&s=TOP), the highest ranking Navy SEAL and the commander of Special Operations Command, Adm. Eric Olson, believes this whole counterinsurgency thing is getting out of hand. He called the prevailing COIN doctrine an “imperfect template,” crafted as an Iraq specific doctrine, that should be discarded. “Counterinsurgency should involve countering the insurgents,” he said.
(more…) (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/27/gen-mcchrystal-and-adm-olson-actually-on-the-same-page/#more-7377)
Posted in Afghan Update (http://defensetech.org/category/afghan-update/), Counterinsurgency (http://defensetech.org/category/commandos/counterinsurgency/) | Comments (25) (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/27/gen-mcchrystal-and-adm-olson-actually-on-the-same-page/#idc-container)
COIN in Afghanistan: The Tyranny of Fires (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/26/coin-in-afghanistan-and-the-tyranny-of-fires/)
Wednesday, May 26th, 2010 http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/05/British-Troops-in-Afghanistan.jpg (http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/05/British-Troops-in-Afghanistan.jpg)
If you haven’t already stumbled across Travels With Shiloh (http://iago18335.wordpress.com/)’s write up of the Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center COIN conference held earlier this month at Ft. Leavenworth, I heartily recommend it. Here is part one (http://iago18335.wordpress.com/2010/05/18/coin-symposium-recap-part-1/).
Monday’s entry featured notes from a presentation by British Army Lt. Col. Rupert Jones, son of another famous LTC Jones, he who commanded 2nd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment during the Falklands campaign. There, LTC Jones lost his life and won the Victoria Cross by charging an Argentine machine gun nest when his battalion’s attack had stalled in the face of enemy fire at Goose Green.
Jones the son had some interesting, and certain to be controversial, comments (http://iago18335.wordpress.com/2010/05/24/coin-symposium-recap-part-5/) on the “tyranny of fires.”
“We have become seduced by the easy availability of air and artillery support. Commanders are giving up maneuver in favor of fire support. Successive ISAF commanders have worked to reduce civilian casualties but we’ve made very little progress and the issue is a strategic threat. We need to break our dependence on fires.
Our reliance on fires creates a toxic psychological dynamic. Among insurgents, the domestic population AND our forces it is assumed that we can’t win without fires and technology.
Assets cost big money to move and maintain in theater. Every asset owner wants to prove their usefulness and contribute to the mission. We’ve got a ‘I’ve got it, I’ll use it’ mentality.
Junior leaders need to accept short term tactical risk and apply the skills they’ve learned when in contact with the enemy.”
(more…) (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/26/coin-in-afghanistan-and-the-tyranny-of-fires/#more-7316)
Posted in Afghan Update (http://defensetech.org/category/afghan-update/), Counterinsurgency (http://defensetech.org/category/commandos/counterinsurgency/) | Comments (50) (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/26/coin-in-afghanistan-and-the-tyranny-of-fires/#idc-container)
Dueling Rifle Rounds: It’s All About the Wound Channel (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/25/dueling-rifle-rounds-it%e2%80%99s-all-about-the-wound-channel/)
Tuesday, May 25th, 2010 http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/05/Soldier-with-M4-Rifle.jpg (http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/05/Soldier-with-M4-Rifle.jpg)
The Times (the British one) has a story about (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article7135496.ece) the continuing debate over the 7.62mm round versus the 5.56mm as employed in the long range firefights in Afghanistan. The story asserts that the 5.56mm round used in the M4 rifle “lacks sufficient velocity and killing power in long-range firefights.” As Defense Tech readers know, we’ve covered this issue before (http://defensetech.org/2010/03/01/taking-back-the-infantry-half-kilometer/).
As for the stopping power of the 5.56mm round, that very topic came up at a roundtable discussion I attended with the Army’s Program Executive Office Soldier last month at Aberdeen Test Center, Md. It led to an interesting discussion about wound dynamics, the “wound channel” and the “bleed out effect.”
Responding to claims that high-velocity 5.56mm rounds pass straight through the body without killing, Brig. Gen. Pete Fuller, the commander of PEO Soldier, said a new 5.56mm round that will be shipped to troops beginning in June, the M855A1 lead free slug, will get rid of what he called “yaw dependency.”
“The current M855 (5.56mm) ball round is yaw dependent. The closer you are to something you’re shooting at, the less yaw it has and it’s going to go right straight through,” said Fuller. Also, the M4 carbine has a 14 ½ inch barrel compared to the 20-inch barrel on the standard M16. “That shorter barrel cut out 5 ½ inches for that round to get to full muzzle velocity,” he said.
Col. Doug Tamilio, project manager for Soldier weapons with the PEO Soldier, discounted the reports of multiple 5.56mm rifle rounds penetrating straight through enemy bodies, “If you look at the bone mass of the human body, there is a lot of bone, if you hit a bone, [the bullet] is not going through the body, its putting an individual down.”
Knockdown is actually a misnomer, said Lt. Col. Christopher Lehner, program manager for individual Soldier weapons at PEO-Soldier. “You generally don’t knock anyone down, unless you have a very, very large round and you hit bone.” What typically brings down a human being when hit with a bullet is the “bleed-out effect”: massive blood loss that causes the body to shut down, the person staggers and then collapses.
(more…) (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/25/dueling-rifle-rounds-it%e2%80%99s-all-about-the-wound-channel/#more-7308)
Posted in Afghan Update (http://defensetech.org/category/afghan-update/), Big Army (http://defensetech.org/category/big-army/) | Comments (112) (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/25/dueling-rifle-rounds-it’s-all-about-the-wound-channel/#idc-container)
Marine Prowlers ‘Jam’ Afghan Skies (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/25/marine-prowlers-jam-afghan-skies/)
Tuesday, May 25th, 2010 http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/05/EA-6B-Prowler.jpg (http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/05/EA-6B-Prowler.jpg)
Military.com editor Ward Carroll and managing editor Christian Lowe are currently embedded with American troops in eastern Afghanistan.
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN – Although the bureau numbers on the fuselages of Marine Electronic Attack Squadron 2’s EA-6B Prowlers tell of jets harkening from the Cold War, the venerable jammers have found a new and vital niche in the counterinsurgency of Afghanistan.
The Prowler was originally designed to fight complex integrated air defense systems like those designed by the former Soviet Union. Through the use of powerful pods slung under each wing, the airplane would “jam” ground-based radars, blinding the enemy and paving the way for attack jets and fighters to hit their targets.
And in the event a SAM site did fire its missiles, the Prowler would launch high-speed anti radiation, or “HARM,” missiles to wipe out the air defense site before it could shoot down any of the American airplanes.
But the Taliban have no complex Soviet-style SAM systems; and the closest thing they have to an integrated air defense is when they coordinate their RPGs with their AK-47s. So what are the Marine Prowlers doing in Afghanistan?
“The EA-6 has always been predominantly non-kinetic type of asset,” said Marine Maj. Robert “Kid” Kudelko, VMAQ-2’s operations officer. “And in a fight that’s increasingly non-kinetic in terms of ‘hearts and minds’ – not wanting to cause collateral damage – we bring another dimension.”
Read the rest of Ward’s story here (http://www.military.com/news/article/marine-prowlers-jam-afghan-skies.html).
Posted in Afghan Update (http://defensetech.org/category/afghan-update/) | Comments (14) (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/25/marine-prowlers-jam-afghan-skies/#idc-container)
MRAPs Take Over for Humvees Off Base (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/24/mraps-take-over-for-humvees-off-base/)
Monday, May 24th, 2010 http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/05/MRAP-off-the-FOB-copy.jpg (http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/05/MRAP-off-the-FOB-copy.jpg)
Our own Christian Lowe is embedded with U.S. forces in Afghanistan through June 1 and sends us this dispatch from FOB Sharana in eastern Afghanistan.
By Christian Lowe
FORWARD OPERATING BASE SHARANA, Afghanistan — In one of the most conspicuous shifts in policy since the war in Afghanistan began, local Army commanders have ordered that Soldiers must be in heavily armored IED-resistant vehicles when leaving the confines of any base in eastern Afghanistan.
Up-armored Humvees, the go-to patrol truck for troops here since 2001, have been relegated to driving within forward operating bases or were donated to the Afghan army and police.
The Pentagon is sending so-called “mine-resistant, ambush-protected” vehicles, or MRAPs, to the theater at a fevered pitch, with planeloads of the heavy trucks arriving daily at FOBs in this region.
The motor pools now feature a hodgepodge of MRAP trucks, including the Navistar International-made MaxxPro; the BAE Systems-made RG-31 Nyala; and the most recent arrival, the Oshkosh-built M-ATV.
Soldiers here say each has its advantages and disadvantages.
“I love the M-ATV,” said Staff Sgt. Philip Burchfield, platoon sergeant with 1st Platoon, Angel Company, 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment. “It can take us places we can’t go with the MaxxPros or RG-31s.”
Battalion officials here want more of the nimble M-ATVs. Their lighter weight, lower profile and more forgiving suspension give unit commanders greater flexibility in supporting troops who have to patrol remote villages situated along roads that better support tractors and livestock than they do trucks.
(more…) (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/24/mraps-take-over-for-humvees-off-base/#more-7244)
Posted in Afghan Update (http://defensetech.org/category/afghan-update/), MRAP Edge (http://defensetech.org/category/mrap-edge/) | Comments (19) (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/24/mraps-take-over-for-humvees-off-base/#idc-container)
COIN in Real Life (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/22/coin-in-real-life/)
Saturday, May 22nd, 2010 We’ve had a lot of discussion at Defense Tech and across other Military.com properties about counterinsurgency and how COIN theory should be applied in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. The echo chamber in DC and military centers of excellence are wallpapered with treatises from think tanks and other annointed 500-pound brains.
As many of you know, Christian and I are in Afghanistan for a few weeks, embedded with ISAF forces. For the last week or so we’ve been arcing around RC-East – places like FOB Salerno and FOB Sharana and combat outposts in Paktika province. During that time we’ve had the opportunity to join the Soldiers of Task Force Rakassan as they conduct mounted patrols through the villages and along the roads (mostly unpaved and very bumpy) of the province. We’ve also walked with them as they methodically engaged the populace, establishing a presence and developing relationships with local leaders.
A write up of COIN theory versus reality as these soldiers are living it every day in Paktika province can be read here (http://www.military.com/news/article/coin-in-paktika-few-facts-little-logic.html).
Watch Capt. Josh Powers as he talks to the villagers of Mest a few days ago. It’s COIN distilled to its essence:
–Ward Carroll
Posted in Afghan Update (http://defensetech.org/category/afghan-update/) | Comments (7) (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/22/coin-in-real-life/#idc-container)
So You Want to be Taliban, Huh? (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/21/so-you-want-to-be-taliban-huh/)
Friday, May 21st, 2010 http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/05/mohammed-omar-227x300.jpg (http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/05/mohammed-omar.jpg)Here are Mullah Mohammed Omar’s La’iha (laws) for those of you in the DT audience ready for a rewarding career in the Taliban:
- MMO is the supreme leader of the Taliban, or “Emir al Mu’manin” (“Leader of the Faithful”).
- Taliban will constructively engage tribal leaders and seek to offer support to the local population.
- Commanders should, when possible, be reassigned to their ancestral tribal areas.
- Captured enemy personnel will be taken to provincial commanders immediately.
- Spies cannot be executed without due process, which is also clearly defined.
- No Taliban will take bribes.
- No Taliban will steal.
- No Taliban will kidnap for ransom inside Afghanistan.
- No Taliban will use torture on captured persons.
- No mutilation, even of corpses.
- There will be no more beheadings, only firing squads.
- No executions will be videotaped.
- No suicide attack will be conducted unless approved by a higher authority.
- Any former government official seeking to join the Taliban must kill or capture a high-ranking enemy to prove himself loyal.
- Captured enemy money and items must be distributed fairly, not kept for personal gain.
- Provincial authorities will be established, creating standardized legal, political, and military structures.
- No smoking.
(As seen on the wall of the tactical operations center at Forward Operating Base Rushmore, Paktika Province, Afghanistan.)
– Ward Carroll
Posted in Afghan Update (http://defensetech.org/category/afghan-update/) | Comments (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/21/so-you-want-to-be-taliban-huh/#idc-container)
Read more: http://defensetech.org/category/afghan-update/#ixzz0qlmQr99G
Defense.org
I enjoyed all the article and links, a good US view
Kandahar Offensive Postponed Until Fall: McChrystal (http://defensetech.org/2010/06/10/kandahar-offensive-postponed-until-fall-mcchrystal/)
http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/06/Stryker-in-Afghanistan.jpg (http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/06/Stryker-in-Afghanistan.jpg)
The offensive planned for this summer to clear and hold Kandahar city will now be delayed until the fall, Afghan commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal tells the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1b651476-74b8-11df-aed7-00144feabdc0.html). The delay will give commanders time to evaluate what went wrong in Marja where a major offensive earlier this year failed to secure the area from Taliban insurgents.
Speaking to reporters at NATO headquarters in Brussels today, McChrystal said (http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4640) operations in Kandahar would be “more deliberate” than initially planned: “I think it will take a number of months for this to play out. But I don’t think that’s necessarily a bad thing. I think it’s more important we get it right than we get it fast.”
McChrystal said there must be visible progress in southern Afghanistan by the end of the year, certainly before NATO’s annual summit in November. After nine years of war, he acknowledged that patience among Afghans, as well as NATO allies, is wearing very thin.
Assessing operations in the Helmand River Valley, he said the major lesson was that the Afghan governance piece, the “build” component of the “clear, hold and build” strategy, must be more robust.
I thought this comment from McChrystal on the difficulty of counterinsurgency was particularly telling:
“Unlike conventional military operations where you circle a hill on the map and then you take the hill, when you go to protect people, the people have to want you to protect them.”
– Greg Grant
Posted in Afghan Update (http://defensetech.org/category/afghan-update/), Counterinsurgency (http://defensetech.org/category/commandos/counterinsurgency/) | Comments (41) (http://defensetech.org/2010/06/10/kandahar-offensive-postponed-until-fall-mcchrystal/#idc-container)
The “Lone Guerrilla Paradox” and the Failure of COIN Doctrine in Afghanistan (http://defensetech.org/2010/06/09/the-lone-guerrilla-paradox-and-the-failure-of-coin-doctrine-in-afghanistan/)
Wednesday, June 9th, 2010 http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/06/Afghan-troops-3.jpg (http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/06/Afghan-troops-3.jpg)
The New York Times runs a story today (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/09/world/asia/09kandahar.html?ref=world) from reporter Rod Nordland in Kandahar about the shift in strategy there away from a military headlined offensive to more aid and reconstruction efforts, with a gradual increase in coalition constables walking the streets.
Partly this is due to local opposition to a military offensive by an “unsympathetic population.” The other major reason, according to the NYT, is the realization among the ISAF command that the much ballyhooed “Operation Moshtarak Phase II,” the Marine Corps air and ground assault on Marja in February, failed.
In a briefing to Pentagon reporters last month, Afghan commander Gen. Stanly McChrystal gave his assessment of the Marja offensive:
“As a counterinsurgency force pushes out insurgents, their smart move is to contest that, to try to undermine what we’ve done. They can’t come in and control Marja like they did before. They can’t raise the flag; they can’t hold terrain. But they can try to convince the people that they’re not secure: Murders, night letters, taxation. And they can try to send a message that says, “This won’t last. The coalition will leave. The government of Afghanistan will leave.”
Then McChrystal described the current security environment in Kandahar:
“[The Taliban] certainly do not control Kandahar city. They can contest parts of Kandahar city and they can create acts so there’s not sufficient security in Kandahar city, but the Taliban do not control the city. You know, you can walk around the streets in Kandahar and there’s business going on. It’s a functioning city.”
These are surprising statements coming from somebody as well versed in counterinsurgency as McChrystal. Insurgents don’t typically “raise the flag,” except perhaps in the final stages of an insurgency when they’ve won the political contest. As far as Kandahar is concerned, the fact that Kandahar city is “functioning” doesn’t mean the insurgents don’t control Kandahar.
One of the many fatal flaws in U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine is the failure to understand the “lone guerrilla paradox,” a concept that has vexed counterinsurgents from Algeria to Vietnam to now Afghanistan.
(more…) (http://defensetech.org/2010/06/09/the-lone-guerrilla-paradox-and-the-failure-of-coin-doctrine-in-afghanistan/#more-7580)
Posted in Afghan Update (http://defensetech.org/category/afghan-update/), Counterinsurgency (http://defensetech.org/category/commandos/counterinsurgency/) | Comments (29) (http://defensetech.org/2010/06/09/the-lone-guerrilla-paradox-and-the-failure-of-coin-doctrine-in-afghanistan/#idc-container)
Strict ROE, Nausea Inducing Screens Curb Use of MV-22 Osprey Gatling Gun (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/28/strict-roe-nausea-inducing-screens-curb-use-of-mv-22-osprey-gatling-gun/)
Friday, May 28th, 2010 http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/05/Osprey-DT-copy.jpg (http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/05/Osprey-DT-copy.jpg)
Our own Christian Lowe is embedded with U.S. forces in Afghanistan through June 1 and sends us this dispatch from Camp Bastion in southern Afghanistan.
By Christian Lowe
CAMP BASTION, Afghanistan — It was touted as the answer to critics who said the MV-22 didn’t have enough firepower on board to shoot its way into a hot LZ.
And here in Afghanistan, this deployment of the MV-22s with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 261 marked the first real-world test of the BAE Systems-made Remote Guardian machine gun system – known in the Corps as the Interim Defensive Weapon System, or “belly gun” for short.
The squadron based here at Bastion air field, adjacent to Camp Leatherneck in Helmand province, has 12 aircraft and an inventory of five of the belly gun systems.
Problem is, they don’t want to use them.
Squadron commander Lt. Col. Ivan Thomas downplayed the difficulties with the system, saying simply that the manufacturer was sending over trainers who could help Marines learn how to use the system more effectively. The IDWS consists of a 7.62mm rotary cannon mounted in a retractable box near amidships on the Osprey’s undercarriage. There’s a targeting and control system inside the bird that uses an X-Box-like controller to steer the optics and gun for 360-degree coverage of the LZ.
Each Osprey also has a M240 7.62mm machine gun mounted to the ramp in the tail. Previous reports have indicated that the Afghanistan Ospreys would have .50 cals mounted on the tail ramp, but the squadron only does that when they think they’re going in guns blazing, which isn’t often.
Thomas said they’ve test fired the Remote Guardian system once, “and it’s extremely accurate,” he said. But with the kind of dynamic approaches these MV-22s are flying into the zone and the difficulty of looking through a soda straw at the LZ and firing at what’s firing at you in time, Thomas has opted to keep the IDWS off every one of his planes.
He argues that the rules of engagement here are so restrictive and the potential downside of a civilian casualty from a misaimed shot so high, he can’t take the risk of firing the Gatling gun if there’s a chance it will miss.
(more…) (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/28/strict-roe-nausea-inducing-screens-curb-use-of-mv-22-osprey-gatling-gun/#more-7395)
Posted in Afghan Update (http://defensetech.org/category/afghan-update/), Grand Ole Osprey (http://defensetech.org/category/grand-ole-osprey/) | Comments (80) (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/28/strict-roe-nausea-inducing-screens-curb-use-of-mv-22-osprey-gatling-gun/#idc-container)
Gen. McChrystal and Adm. Olson Actually on the Same Page (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/27/gen-mcchrystal-and-adm-olson-actually-on-the-same-page/)
Thursday, May 27th, 2010 http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/05/Training-Afghans.jpg (http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/05/Training-Afghans.jpg)
Afghan commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s counterinsurgency guidance (http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/counterinsurgency_guidance.pdf) has taken what many considered to be a very, very soft approach to combating insurgents as laid down in the COIN manual, and softened it even more.
Protecting the population, respecting their culture and sitting and drinking lots of tea with local leaders to gain their trust basically by doing no wrong is the basis of what has been labeled the “population centric counterinsurgency” approach in Afghanistan. The Economist (http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2009/08/is_general_mcchrystal_a_hippie) called it “the least violence-oriented military document you’re ever likely to see.”
“We will not win by simply killing insurgents,” McChrystal wrote; the supply of willing insurgent foot soldiers in that part of the world is infinity. He then explained his version of COIN arithmetic which turns the conventional mindset of wearing down the enemy through attrition on its head.
“From a conventional standpoint, the killing of two insurgents in a group of ten leaves eight remaining: 10–2=8. From the insurgent standpoint, those two killed were likely related to many others who will want vengeance… Therefore, the death of two creates more willing recruits: 10 minus 2 equals 20 (or more) rather than 8.”
According to some reports (http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4643956&c=LAN&s=TOP), the highest ranking Navy SEAL and the commander of Special Operations Command, Adm. Eric Olson, believes this whole counterinsurgency thing is getting out of hand. He called the prevailing COIN doctrine an “imperfect template,” crafted as an Iraq specific doctrine, that should be discarded. “Counterinsurgency should involve countering the insurgents,” he said.
(more…) (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/27/gen-mcchrystal-and-adm-olson-actually-on-the-same-page/#more-7377)
Posted in Afghan Update (http://defensetech.org/category/afghan-update/), Counterinsurgency (http://defensetech.org/category/commandos/counterinsurgency/) | Comments (25) (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/27/gen-mcchrystal-and-adm-olson-actually-on-the-same-page/#idc-container)
COIN in Afghanistan: The Tyranny of Fires (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/26/coin-in-afghanistan-and-the-tyranny-of-fires/)
Wednesday, May 26th, 2010 http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/05/British-Troops-in-Afghanistan.jpg (http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/05/British-Troops-in-Afghanistan.jpg)
If you haven’t already stumbled across Travels With Shiloh (http://iago18335.wordpress.com/)’s write up of the Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center COIN conference held earlier this month at Ft. Leavenworth, I heartily recommend it. Here is part one (http://iago18335.wordpress.com/2010/05/18/coin-symposium-recap-part-1/).
Monday’s entry featured notes from a presentation by British Army Lt. Col. Rupert Jones, son of another famous LTC Jones, he who commanded 2nd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment during the Falklands campaign. There, LTC Jones lost his life and won the Victoria Cross by charging an Argentine machine gun nest when his battalion’s attack had stalled in the face of enemy fire at Goose Green.
Jones the son had some interesting, and certain to be controversial, comments (http://iago18335.wordpress.com/2010/05/24/coin-symposium-recap-part-5/) on the “tyranny of fires.”
“We have become seduced by the easy availability of air and artillery support. Commanders are giving up maneuver in favor of fire support. Successive ISAF commanders have worked to reduce civilian casualties but we’ve made very little progress and the issue is a strategic threat. We need to break our dependence on fires.
Our reliance on fires creates a toxic psychological dynamic. Among insurgents, the domestic population AND our forces it is assumed that we can’t win without fires and technology.
Assets cost big money to move and maintain in theater. Every asset owner wants to prove their usefulness and contribute to the mission. We’ve got a ‘I’ve got it, I’ll use it’ mentality.
Junior leaders need to accept short term tactical risk and apply the skills they’ve learned when in contact with the enemy.”
(more…) (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/26/coin-in-afghanistan-and-the-tyranny-of-fires/#more-7316)
Posted in Afghan Update (http://defensetech.org/category/afghan-update/), Counterinsurgency (http://defensetech.org/category/commandos/counterinsurgency/) | Comments (50) (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/26/coin-in-afghanistan-and-the-tyranny-of-fires/#idc-container)
Dueling Rifle Rounds: It’s All About the Wound Channel (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/25/dueling-rifle-rounds-it%e2%80%99s-all-about-the-wound-channel/)
Tuesday, May 25th, 2010 http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/05/Soldier-with-M4-Rifle.jpg (http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/05/Soldier-with-M4-Rifle.jpg)
The Times (the British one) has a story about (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article7135496.ece) the continuing debate over the 7.62mm round versus the 5.56mm as employed in the long range firefights in Afghanistan. The story asserts that the 5.56mm round used in the M4 rifle “lacks sufficient velocity and killing power in long-range firefights.” As Defense Tech readers know, we’ve covered this issue before (http://defensetech.org/2010/03/01/taking-back-the-infantry-half-kilometer/).
As for the stopping power of the 5.56mm round, that very topic came up at a roundtable discussion I attended with the Army’s Program Executive Office Soldier last month at Aberdeen Test Center, Md. It led to an interesting discussion about wound dynamics, the “wound channel” and the “bleed out effect.”
Responding to claims that high-velocity 5.56mm rounds pass straight through the body without killing, Brig. Gen. Pete Fuller, the commander of PEO Soldier, said a new 5.56mm round that will be shipped to troops beginning in June, the M855A1 lead free slug, will get rid of what he called “yaw dependency.”
“The current M855 (5.56mm) ball round is yaw dependent. The closer you are to something you’re shooting at, the less yaw it has and it’s going to go right straight through,” said Fuller. Also, the M4 carbine has a 14 ½ inch barrel compared to the 20-inch barrel on the standard M16. “That shorter barrel cut out 5 ½ inches for that round to get to full muzzle velocity,” he said.
Col. Doug Tamilio, project manager for Soldier weapons with the PEO Soldier, discounted the reports of multiple 5.56mm rifle rounds penetrating straight through enemy bodies, “If you look at the bone mass of the human body, there is a lot of bone, if you hit a bone, [the bullet] is not going through the body, its putting an individual down.”
Knockdown is actually a misnomer, said Lt. Col. Christopher Lehner, program manager for individual Soldier weapons at PEO-Soldier. “You generally don’t knock anyone down, unless you have a very, very large round and you hit bone.” What typically brings down a human being when hit with a bullet is the “bleed-out effect”: massive blood loss that causes the body to shut down, the person staggers and then collapses.
(more…) (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/25/dueling-rifle-rounds-it%e2%80%99s-all-about-the-wound-channel/#more-7308)
Posted in Afghan Update (http://defensetech.org/category/afghan-update/), Big Army (http://defensetech.org/category/big-army/) | Comments (112) (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/25/dueling-rifle-rounds-it’s-all-about-the-wound-channel/#idc-container)
Marine Prowlers ‘Jam’ Afghan Skies (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/25/marine-prowlers-jam-afghan-skies/)
Tuesday, May 25th, 2010 http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/05/EA-6B-Prowler.jpg (http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/05/EA-6B-Prowler.jpg)
Military.com editor Ward Carroll and managing editor Christian Lowe are currently embedded with American troops in eastern Afghanistan.
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN – Although the bureau numbers on the fuselages of Marine Electronic Attack Squadron 2’s EA-6B Prowlers tell of jets harkening from the Cold War, the venerable jammers have found a new and vital niche in the counterinsurgency of Afghanistan.
The Prowler was originally designed to fight complex integrated air defense systems like those designed by the former Soviet Union. Through the use of powerful pods slung under each wing, the airplane would “jam” ground-based radars, blinding the enemy and paving the way for attack jets and fighters to hit their targets.
And in the event a SAM site did fire its missiles, the Prowler would launch high-speed anti radiation, or “HARM,” missiles to wipe out the air defense site before it could shoot down any of the American airplanes.
But the Taliban have no complex Soviet-style SAM systems; and the closest thing they have to an integrated air defense is when they coordinate their RPGs with their AK-47s. So what are the Marine Prowlers doing in Afghanistan?
“The EA-6 has always been predominantly non-kinetic type of asset,” said Marine Maj. Robert “Kid” Kudelko, VMAQ-2’s operations officer. “And in a fight that’s increasingly non-kinetic in terms of ‘hearts and minds’ – not wanting to cause collateral damage – we bring another dimension.”
Read the rest of Ward’s story here (http://www.military.com/news/article/marine-prowlers-jam-afghan-skies.html).
Posted in Afghan Update (http://defensetech.org/category/afghan-update/) | Comments (14) (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/25/marine-prowlers-jam-afghan-skies/#idc-container)
MRAPs Take Over for Humvees Off Base (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/24/mraps-take-over-for-humvees-off-base/)
Monday, May 24th, 2010 http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/05/MRAP-off-the-FOB-copy.jpg (http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/05/MRAP-off-the-FOB-copy.jpg)
Our own Christian Lowe is embedded with U.S. forces in Afghanistan through June 1 and sends us this dispatch from FOB Sharana in eastern Afghanistan.
By Christian Lowe
FORWARD OPERATING BASE SHARANA, Afghanistan — In one of the most conspicuous shifts in policy since the war in Afghanistan began, local Army commanders have ordered that Soldiers must be in heavily armored IED-resistant vehicles when leaving the confines of any base in eastern Afghanistan.
Up-armored Humvees, the go-to patrol truck for troops here since 2001, have been relegated to driving within forward operating bases or were donated to the Afghan army and police.
The Pentagon is sending so-called “mine-resistant, ambush-protected” vehicles, or MRAPs, to the theater at a fevered pitch, with planeloads of the heavy trucks arriving daily at FOBs in this region.
The motor pools now feature a hodgepodge of MRAP trucks, including the Navistar International-made MaxxPro; the BAE Systems-made RG-31 Nyala; and the most recent arrival, the Oshkosh-built M-ATV.
Soldiers here say each has its advantages and disadvantages.
“I love the M-ATV,” said Staff Sgt. Philip Burchfield, platoon sergeant with 1st Platoon, Angel Company, 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment. “It can take us places we can’t go with the MaxxPros or RG-31s.”
Battalion officials here want more of the nimble M-ATVs. Their lighter weight, lower profile and more forgiving suspension give unit commanders greater flexibility in supporting troops who have to patrol remote villages situated along roads that better support tractors and livestock than they do trucks.
(more…) (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/24/mraps-take-over-for-humvees-off-base/#more-7244)
Posted in Afghan Update (http://defensetech.org/category/afghan-update/), MRAP Edge (http://defensetech.org/category/mrap-edge/) | Comments (19) (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/24/mraps-take-over-for-humvees-off-base/#idc-container)
COIN in Real Life (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/22/coin-in-real-life/)
Saturday, May 22nd, 2010 We’ve had a lot of discussion at Defense Tech and across other Military.com properties about counterinsurgency and how COIN theory should be applied in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. The echo chamber in DC and military centers of excellence are wallpapered with treatises from think tanks and other annointed 500-pound brains.
As many of you know, Christian and I are in Afghanistan for a few weeks, embedded with ISAF forces. For the last week or so we’ve been arcing around RC-East – places like FOB Salerno and FOB Sharana and combat outposts in Paktika province. During that time we’ve had the opportunity to join the Soldiers of Task Force Rakassan as they conduct mounted patrols through the villages and along the roads (mostly unpaved and very bumpy) of the province. We’ve also walked with them as they methodically engaged the populace, establishing a presence and developing relationships with local leaders.
A write up of COIN theory versus reality as these soldiers are living it every day in Paktika province can be read here (http://www.military.com/news/article/coin-in-paktika-few-facts-little-logic.html).
Watch Capt. Josh Powers as he talks to the villagers of Mest a few days ago. It’s COIN distilled to its essence:
–Ward Carroll
Posted in Afghan Update (http://defensetech.org/category/afghan-update/) | Comments (7) (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/22/coin-in-real-life/#idc-container)
So You Want to be Taliban, Huh? (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/21/so-you-want-to-be-taliban-huh/)
Friday, May 21st, 2010 http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/05/mohammed-omar-227x300.jpg (http://defensetech.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/05/mohammed-omar.jpg)Here are Mullah Mohammed Omar’s La’iha (laws) for those of you in the DT audience ready for a rewarding career in the Taliban:
- MMO is the supreme leader of the Taliban, or “Emir al Mu’manin” (“Leader of the Faithful”).
- Taliban will constructively engage tribal leaders and seek to offer support to the local population.
- Commanders should, when possible, be reassigned to their ancestral tribal areas.
- Captured enemy personnel will be taken to provincial commanders immediately.
- Spies cannot be executed without due process, which is also clearly defined.
- No Taliban will take bribes.
- No Taliban will steal.
- No Taliban will kidnap for ransom inside Afghanistan.
- No Taliban will use torture on captured persons.
- No mutilation, even of corpses.
- There will be no more beheadings, only firing squads.
- No executions will be videotaped.
- No suicide attack will be conducted unless approved by a higher authority.
- Any former government official seeking to join the Taliban must kill or capture a high-ranking enemy to prove himself loyal.
- Captured enemy money and items must be distributed fairly, not kept for personal gain.
- Provincial authorities will be established, creating standardized legal, political, and military structures.
- No smoking.
(As seen on the wall of the tactical operations center at Forward Operating Base Rushmore, Paktika Province, Afghanistan.)
– Ward Carroll
Posted in Afghan Update (http://defensetech.org/category/afghan-update/) | Comments (http://defensetech.org/2010/05/21/so-you-want-to-be-taliban-huh/#idc-container)
Read more: http://defensetech.org/category/afghan-update/#ixzz0qlmQr99G
Defense.org
I enjoyed all the article and links, a good US view