bobdina
10-07-2009, 11:07 PM
Embedding soldiers paying off, says Afghan commander
Published On Wed Oct 07 2009
KANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN – It's one of the basic tenets of counter-insurgency, and it's being deployed aggressively in the dangerous regions southwest of Kandahar city: drive out the enemy, make the area safe for the locals, and then stay there as long as you can.
Creating a base of operations and making it secure is considered one of the first major rules in defeating groups like the Taliban. As part of the Afghan effort, Canadian forces have cleared a handful of villages in the Dand and Panjwaii districts in recent months and simply moved in.
The hope is that as that military "footprint" continues to grow, the effect of marginalizing insurgents will grow with it.
"At the end of the day, the approach that we took is pure counter-insurgency," said Lt.-Col. Joe Paul, 42, the commander of Canada's battle group in Afghanistan, known as Task Force Kandahar.
It's part of a larger strategy being employed by Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan and the man who has been urging President Barack Obama in recent weeks to send tens of thousands of additional troops to the country.
"Everything that Gen. McChrystal is trying to implement right now is doctrine that has been taught in command staff college," Paul said.
Villages such as Salavat and Salakhan, as well as the so-called ``model village" in Deh-e-Bagh in the Dand district, have been the earliest beneficiaries of Canada's presence there, said Paul. Deh-e-Bagh, where the strategy was first deployed, has seen an era of relative peace and prosperity.
As trust of the coalition grows, other villages will follow suit, he said – but only if Canadian forces remain a significant and visible presence.
"It's very, very difficult," Paul said. "It's a helluva challenge for the Canadian soldier. You've really got to overcome the language barrier, the cultural barrier. You have to work to create bonds with someone who is very different than us."
The good news, however, is that it seems to be working.
Canadian troops are getting dramatically better intelligence from villagers now than they were before the summer, and they're getting more of it, said Paul. Company commanders are in the process of conducting a census of the local population, he added.
"We are now reaching that level of knowledge which is unprecedented," Paul said as he described his "dossier" of local villagers in the area, comprised of digital photographs and information on each one.
"I got a report with lists of names of who is who: 'X is an insurgent, Y is a sympathizer and Z is sitting on the fence.' And the only reason why we can get there is because we live there."
The battle being fought with the Taliban at the moment is essentially a war of words, said Paul. Villagers feel safe and secure in the belief that the presence of the Canadians will eventually lead to jobs, security and prosperity, so it's vital that it happen quickly.
"We can help them open clinics and schools, but we have to do more than talk about it. We have to deliver," Paul said. "The Taliban, they don't deliver anything."
"It's a matter of depleting their influence. Not their numbers, because only having kinetic action on the battlefield will not bring victory. It is a matter of influence."
Another key tool in limiting the influence of the Taliban is the ability to provide jobs for the young people living in southern Afghanistan, many of whom are commonly swayed by insurgents to set an improvised explosive device in exchange for $50.
"Every single time I am engaging in a shura, I say to them, `Please talk to your young men,"' Paul said. "'Ensure they aren't going to be tempted by the Taliban to take a few quick shots at us, because they will end up being killed.'
Early in the summer in the vicinity of Deh-e-Bagh in the Dand district, Taliban leaders were reportedly having difficulty conscripting local help because the young people in the area were already busy helping the coalition with development projects, Paul chuckled.
"They weren't willing to volunteer to get $50 from the Taliban," he said. "It helped us to create a wedge."
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/article/706754--Somnia
Published On Wed Oct 07 2009
KANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN – It's one of the basic tenets of counter-insurgency, and it's being deployed aggressively in the dangerous regions southwest of Kandahar city: drive out the enemy, make the area safe for the locals, and then stay there as long as you can.
Creating a base of operations and making it secure is considered one of the first major rules in defeating groups like the Taliban. As part of the Afghan effort, Canadian forces have cleared a handful of villages in the Dand and Panjwaii districts in recent months and simply moved in.
The hope is that as that military "footprint" continues to grow, the effect of marginalizing insurgents will grow with it.
"At the end of the day, the approach that we took is pure counter-insurgency," said Lt.-Col. Joe Paul, 42, the commander of Canada's battle group in Afghanistan, known as Task Force Kandahar.
It's part of a larger strategy being employed by Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan and the man who has been urging President Barack Obama in recent weeks to send tens of thousands of additional troops to the country.
"Everything that Gen. McChrystal is trying to implement right now is doctrine that has been taught in command staff college," Paul said.
Villages such as Salavat and Salakhan, as well as the so-called ``model village" in Deh-e-Bagh in the Dand district, have been the earliest beneficiaries of Canada's presence there, said Paul. Deh-e-Bagh, where the strategy was first deployed, has seen an era of relative peace and prosperity.
As trust of the coalition grows, other villages will follow suit, he said – but only if Canadian forces remain a significant and visible presence.
"It's very, very difficult," Paul said. "It's a helluva challenge for the Canadian soldier. You've really got to overcome the language barrier, the cultural barrier. You have to work to create bonds with someone who is very different than us."
The good news, however, is that it seems to be working.
Canadian troops are getting dramatically better intelligence from villagers now than they were before the summer, and they're getting more of it, said Paul. Company commanders are in the process of conducting a census of the local population, he added.
"We are now reaching that level of knowledge which is unprecedented," Paul said as he described his "dossier" of local villagers in the area, comprised of digital photographs and information on each one.
"I got a report with lists of names of who is who: 'X is an insurgent, Y is a sympathizer and Z is sitting on the fence.' And the only reason why we can get there is because we live there."
The battle being fought with the Taliban at the moment is essentially a war of words, said Paul. Villagers feel safe and secure in the belief that the presence of the Canadians will eventually lead to jobs, security and prosperity, so it's vital that it happen quickly.
"We can help them open clinics and schools, but we have to do more than talk about it. We have to deliver," Paul said. "The Taliban, they don't deliver anything."
"It's a matter of depleting their influence. Not their numbers, because only having kinetic action on the battlefield will not bring victory. It is a matter of influence."
Another key tool in limiting the influence of the Taliban is the ability to provide jobs for the young people living in southern Afghanistan, many of whom are commonly swayed by insurgents to set an improvised explosive device in exchange for $50.
"Every single time I am engaging in a shura, I say to them, `Please talk to your young men,"' Paul said. "'Ensure they aren't going to be tempted by the Taliban to take a few quick shots at us, because they will end up being killed.'
Early in the summer in the vicinity of Deh-e-Bagh in the Dand district, Taliban leaders were reportedly having difficulty conscripting local help because the young people in the area were already busy helping the coalition with development projects, Paul chuckled.
"They weren't willing to volunteer to get $50 from the Taliban," he said. "It helped us to create a wedge."
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/article/706754--Somnia