bobdina
06-27-2009, 03:57 PM
By Erik Holmes - Staff writer
Posted : Saturday Jun 27, 2009 9:06:33 EDT
Stricter rules for combat in Afghanistan will cause Air Force commanders to be more careful when authorizing airstrikes but won’t significantly reduce the role of air power in the war, according to defense experts.
The directive, from Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the new U.S. commander in Afghanistan, tells air and ground forces not to attack buildings where insurgents may be hiding among civilians unless coalition troops are at risk. An air attack in May that killed a disputed number of civilians caused international outrage and prompted the change.
Despite the new policy, the U.S. will continue to conduct the war much as it has the last eight years, experts said.
For example, air power is essential in Afghanistan. It is a relatively large country with difficult terrain and only a modest number of ground troops to cover it, said Mackenzie Eaglen of the Heritage Foundation, a conservative Washington-based think tank. And when ground troops need air support, she said, they will get it.
“I think U.S. forces will continue to rely on close-air support as much as they have in the past,” Eaglan said. “Air power, or the need for it on the ground, will not be diminished in any way.”
Rebecca Grant, a senior fellow at the Lexington Institute, a Virginia-based think tank, agrees the policy will have only a limited effect on air power in Afghanistan.
“What we’ve seen historically is that the ordnance dropped tracks directly with the level of engagement on the ground, and I’d expect that to continue,” she said. “Will everyone review their procedures? Yes. Will forces on the ground be doubly careful about the bombs they’re asking for? Yes, but they are already. And will there still be some tragic mistakes? Unfortunately, yes.”
If the policy change represents a broader move away from airstrikes, however, it would be a victory for the insurgents, said retired Gen. T. Michael Moseley, the former Air Force chief of staff.
“If you and I were bad guys, the thing we fear the most is the thing we can’t do anything about, and that’s precision airstrikes,” Moseley said. “There’s nothing that those guys can do to defend themselves against a [Joint Direct Attack Munition] or a Hellfire. ... One way [for the enemy] to mitigate that is to make it fall into the [public relations] or the strategic communications world [where] it’s too costly for the Americans” to use airstrikes.
The experts agreed that one reason McChrystal’s order may have a limited effect is because air commanders and those on the ground who call in airstrikes are already careful to avoid civilian casualties. That they still happen is a testament to the violence and unpredictability inherent in any war, they say.
As commander of U.S. Central Command Air Forces during the early days of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, Moseley oversaw thousands of airstrikes, some of which resulted in civilian casualties. He said the issue was always foremost in his mind.
“People that have not spent time in a [air operations center] ... don’t really understand what goes into the application of the technology ... and haven’t sat through hundreds and hundreds of these things when you choose not to deliver ordnance because you would have a debilitating effect on the structures around it or you’re too close [to civilians],” he said.
Another reason the order will have limited implications for the air war is that it will only affect a small percentage of air sorties, Grant said. Most sorties are intelligence-gathering or show-of-force missions that do not involve weapons, she said, and even most ordnance-dropping sorties do not involve the kinds of close calls where civilians might be near legitimate targets.
That there is a perception among Afghan civilians and others that the U.S. indiscriminately bombs targets is evidence of the Taliban’s success in dictating the terms of the information and public relations war, Moseley said.
“They’ve done a pretty good job in the strategic communications world of beginning to make this [issue] costly,” he said.
And even if McChrystal’s policy has little tangible effect on the number of airstrikes, it is a tacit admission that the U.S. is losing the information war, which many believe is the key to winning a counterinsurgency war like that in Afghanistan.
“The U.S. has been losing this information operations or PR war over airstrikes and civilian casualties for over a year now,” Eaglen said. “In many ways, the mass casualty civilian strikes ... are the primary threat to our credibility. The Taliban and al-Qaida have been able to exploit the [issue], and this is where we’re primarily losing.” http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/06/airforce_afghanistan_062709/
Posted : Saturday Jun 27, 2009 9:06:33 EDT
Stricter rules for combat in Afghanistan will cause Air Force commanders to be more careful when authorizing airstrikes but won’t significantly reduce the role of air power in the war, according to defense experts.
The directive, from Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the new U.S. commander in Afghanistan, tells air and ground forces not to attack buildings where insurgents may be hiding among civilians unless coalition troops are at risk. An air attack in May that killed a disputed number of civilians caused international outrage and prompted the change.
Despite the new policy, the U.S. will continue to conduct the war much as it has the last eight years, experts said.
For example, air power is essential in Afghanistan. It is a relatively large country with difficult terrain and only a modest number of ground troops to cover it, said Mackenzie Eaglen of the Heritage Foundation, a conservative Washington-based think tank. And when ground troops need air support, she said, they will get it.
“I think U.S. forces will continue to rely on close-air support as much as they have in the past,” Eaglan said. “Air power, or the need for it on the ground, will not be diminished in any way.”
Rebecca Grant, a senior fellow at the Lexington Institute, a Virginia-based think tank, agrees the policy will have only a limited effect on air power in Afghanistan.
“What we’ve seen historically is that the ordnance dropped tracks directly with the level of engagement on the ground, and I’d expect that to continue,” she said. “Will everyone review their procedures? Yes. Will forces on the ground be doubly careful about the bombs they’re asking for? Yes, but they are already. And will there still be some tragic mistakes? Unfortunately, yes.”
If the policy change represents a broader move away from airstrikes, however, it would be a victory for the insurgents, said retired Gen. T. Michael Moseley, the former Air Force chief of staff.
“If you and I were bad guys, the thing we fear the most is the thing we can’t do anything about, and that’s precision airstrikes,” Moseley said. “There’s nothing that those guys can do to defend themselves against a [Joint Direct Attack Munition] or a Hellfire. ... One way [for the enemy] to mitigate that is to make it fall into the [public relations] or the strategic communications world [where] it’s too costly for the Americans” to use airstrikes.
The experts agreed that one reason McChrystal’s order may have a limited effect is because air commanders and those on the ground who call in airstrikes are already careful to avoid civilian casualties. That they still happen is a testament to the violence and unpredictability inherent in any war, they say.
As commander of U.S. Central Command Air Forces during the early days of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, Moseley oversaw thousands of airstrikes, some of which resulted in civilian casualties. He said the issue was always foremost in his mind.
“People that have not spent time in a [air operations center] ... don’t really understand what goes into the application of the technology ... and haven’t sat through hundreds and hundreds of these things when you choose not to deliver ordnance because you would have a debilitating effect on the structures around it or you’re too close [to civilians],” he said.
Another reason the order will have limited implications for the air war is that it will only affect a small percentage of air sorties, Grant said. Most sorties are intelligence-gathering or show-of-force missions that do not involve weapons, she said, and even most ordnance-dropping sorties do not involve the kinds of close calls where civilians might be near legitimate targets.
That there is a perception among Afghan civilians and others that the U.S. indiscriminately bombs targets is evidence of the Taliban’s success in dictating the terms of the information and public relations war, Moseley said.
“They’ve done a pretty good job in the strategic communications world of beginning to make this [issue] costly,” he said.
And even if McChrystal’s policy has little tangible effect on the number of airstrikes, it is a tacit admission that the U.S. is losing the information war, which many believe is the key to winning a counterinsurgency war like that in Afghanistan.
“The U.S. has been losing this information operations or PR war over airstrikes and civilian casualties for over a year now,” Eaglen said. “In many ways, the mass casualty civilian strikes ... are the primary threat to our credibility. The Taliban and al-Qaida have been able to exploit the [issue], and this is where we’re primarily losing.” http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/06/airforce_afghanistan_062709/