ianstone
10-09-2010, 03:37 PM
Afghan recruits short of the mark
INTEGRATION of locals with NATO units is not going well.
AS insurgent gunfire spat overhead, some soldiers stared listlessly at the sky, their hands pressed to their ears.
Others crawled among the vines, huddling among the roots, dazed and disoriented, their weapons useless in their hands.
Befuddled on hash, one machine-gunner dozed off, oblivious to the firefight around him.
A junior officer appeared briefly to chastise another group of troops for getting stoned, before he too wandered off and fell asleep, ignored by his men.
The rookie platoon of Afghan National Army troops was part of a recruitment surge designed to pave the way for NATO's eventual withdrawal from the country.
But their first experience of action against the Taliban in Zhari district last week appeared to overwhelm them - to the utter scorn of their US allies.
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"Look at that one," said an American 101st Airborne trooper, pointing out an ANA soldier who wandered down a vineyard track in the midst of the shooting, glassy-eyed, without any weapon.
"Guess he knows Afghan judo. I don't know what it is with this unit, but they are worse than useless.
"We are supposed to get some local intelligence benefits from working with them. We don't. Cultural understanding? None. They are a complete liability."
By October next year Afghan security forces, including police and soldiers, should have reached 305,000, of which 171,600 will be ANA.
In the past year alone, ANA recruitment has doubled, giving the army a force, at least on paper, of 134,000.
For the US troops of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne, fighting in Zhari as part of Operation Dragon Strike, the ANA's lack of professionalism is of special concern.
Since arriving in southern Afghanistan in the northern summer as part of US President Barack Obama's final American surge, they have been directly partnered with Afghan surge troops from the newly formed 3rd Brigade, 205 Corps, of the ANA.
Unlike in other areas of Afghanistan, where NATO troops commonly operate alongside, but separately from, Afghan soldiers, in Zhari the 101st Airborne have integrated their units with the ANA down to section level, as part of a project known as shonna ba shonna (shoulder to shoulder), which is intended to magnify the force's capabilities.
Lieutenant Colonel Peter Benchoff, commanding officer of one of the 101st Airborne battalions involved in the project, voiced his frustration. "There is friction associated with this process," he said.
"We are enmeshing an aggressive American culture with a developing Afghan military culture.
"We are slowing down and expecting them to speed up. In six to eight months time either we will all be exceptionally good, or it will have failed."
In Zhari last week, during a battle group push by a battalion of 101st Airborne troops and ANA forces, the project's good intentions seemed to fade in the face of enemy gunfire.
Few soldiers among the 4th ANA Company seemed even to know how to fire their weapons properly. Their machine-gunners had left most of their ammunition behind. They refused to provide sentries, or else slept at their posts.
Drug use was rife and overt. With one exception, a tough Tajik from the north, their officers were weak. The company commander seemed to be in hiding for most of the operation while one of their platoon commanders, shortly after US troops discovered an improvised explosive device, simply walked away from his men as he beat a retreat for the safety of a compound.
There were cultural tensions, too. A group of ANA soldiers became visibly angered when US troops collected literature from an abandoned compound for intelligence assessment.
The ANA thought the Americans had got hold of a Koran, and demanded that it be returned.
Feelings on both sides ran high before an interpreter explained that there was no Koran among the books and documents.
"Most of these troops are completely illiterate," a junior US officer noted.
"They see a book and associate it with the Koran."
More commonly known for ferocity in action, if not tactical skills, it was unusual to see the ANA in such disorder and NATO officers were quick to point out the inexperience of the ANA's 3rd Brigade. "You've got to force the pace to make progress here," said one senior officer in Kandahar, "but in doing so you'll have good and bad stages".
But some of the 101st troops compared them instead to another force well known for its ferocity and stoicism.
"Imagine if we had come here allied with the Taliban to fight against the ANA," one US sergeant mused.
"It'd be all over by now."
INTEGRATION of locals with NATO units is not going well.
AS insurgent gunfire spat overhead, some soldiers stared listlessly at the sky, their hands pressed to their ears.
Others crawled among the vines, huddling among the roots, dazed and disoriented, their weapons useless in their hands.
Befuddled on hash, one machine-gunner dozed off, oblivious to the firefight around him.
A junior officer appeared briefly to chastise another group of troops for getting stoned, before he too wandered off and fell asleep, ignored by his men.
The rookie platoon of Afghan National Army troops was part of a recruitment surge designed to pave the way for NATO's eventual withdrawal from the country.
But their first experience of action against the Taliban in Zhari district last week appeared to overwhelm them - to the utter scorn of their US allies.
Start of sidebar. Skip to end of sidebar. (http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/afghan-recruits-short-of-the-mark/story-e6frg6so-1225936161414#sidebar-end)
End of sidebar. Return to start of sidebar. (http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/afghan-recruits-short-of-the-mark/story-e6frg6so-1225936161414#sidebar-start)
"Look at that one," said an American 101st Airborne trooper, pointing out an ANA soldier who wandered down a vineyard track in the midst of the shooting, glassy-eyed, without any weapon.
"Guess he knows Afghan judo. I don't know what it is with this unit, but they are worse than useless.
"We are supposed to get some local intelligence benefits from working with them. We don't. Cultural understanding? None. They are a complete liability."
By October next year Afghan security forces, including police and soldiers, should have reached 305,000, of which 171,600 will be ANA.
In the past year alone, ANA recruitment has doubled, giving the army a force, at least on paper, of 134,000.
For the US troops of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne, fighting in Zhari as part of Operation Dragon Strike, the ANA's lack of professionalism is of special concern.
Since arriving in southern Afghanistan in the northern summer as part of US President Barack Obama's final American surge, they have been directly partnered with Afghan surge troops from the newly formed 3rd Brigade, 205 Corps, of the ANA.
Unlike in other areas of Afghanistan, where NATO troops commonly operate alongside, but separately from, Afghan soldiers, in Zhari the 101st Airborne have integrated their units with the ANA down to section level, as part of a project known as shonna ba shonna (shoulder to shoulder), which is intended to magnify the force's capabilities.
Lieutenant Colonel Peter Benchoff, commanding officer of one of the 101st Airborne battalions involved in the project, voiced his frustration. "There is friction associated with this process," he said.
"We are enmeshing an aggressive American culture with a developing Afghan military culture.
"We are slowing down and expecting them to speed up. In six to eight months time either we will all be exceptionally good, or it will have failed."
In Zhari last week, during a battle group push by a battalion of 101st Airborne troops and ANA forces, the project's good intentions seemed to fade in the face of enemy gunfire.
Few soldiers among the 4th ANA Company seemed even to know how to fire their weapons properly. Their machine-gunners had left most of their ammunition behind. They refused to provide sentries, or else slept at their posts.
Drug use was rife and overt. With one exception, a tough Tajik from the north, their officers were weak. The company commander seemed to be in hiding for most of the operation while one of their platoon commanders, shortly after US troops discovered an improvised explosive device, simply walked away from his men as he beat a retreat for the safety of a compound.
There were cultural tensions, too. A group of ANA soldiers became visibly angered when US troops collected literature from an abandoned compound for intelligence assessment.
The ANA thought the Americans had got hold of a Koran, and demanded that it be returned.
Feelings on both sides ran high before an interpreter explained that there was no Koran among the books and documents.
"Most of these troops are completely illiterate," a junior US officer noted.
"They see a book and associate it with the Koran."
More commonly known for ferocity in action, if not tactical skills, it was unusual to see the ANA in such disorder and NATO officers were quick to point out the inexperience of the ANA's 3rd Brigade. "You've got to force the pace to make progress here," said one senior officer in Kandahar, "but in doing so you'll have good and bad stages".
But some of the 101st troops compared them instead to another force well known for its ferocity and stoicism.
"Imagine if we had come here allied with the Taliban to fight against the ANA," one US sergeant mused.
"It'd be all over by now."